

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06152 01 OF 02 122242Z

64

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 TRSE-00 EB-07 CU-02 OES-03

SAM-01 AGR-05 OMB-01 FEA-01 INT-05 CIEP-01 /108 W

----- 111385

R 121830Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4548

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NY

USLO PEKING

AMCONGEN HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6152

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR GW CH

SUBJECT: NAC: FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDTS VISIT TO CHINA

REF: BONN 18230

AT NOVEMBER 12 MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, KRAPF
(FRG) DREW UPON AND CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING SPEAKING NOTES
ON SCHMIDTS OCTOBER 29 NOVEMBER 2 VISIT TO CHINA.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: VISIT BY FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO CHINA FROM
29 OCT TO 2 NOV 1975

I. GENERAL

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PAGE 02 NATO 06152 01 OF 02 122242Z

1. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR, WHOSE DELEGATION COMPRISED
SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE UNION ADVISORS, VISITED
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM 29 OCTOBER TO 2 NOVEMBER.
DURING HIS STAR IN PEKING, DETAILED TALKS TOOK PLACE WITH

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY WITH MAO TSE-TUNG AND TENG HSIOO-PING. DURING THE VISIT, AGREEMENTS ON AIR TRAFFIC AND SHIPPING QUESTIONS WERE SIGNED; IN ADDITION, LETTERS WERE EXCHANGED ON THE CREATION OF A GERMAN- CHINESE MIXED COMMISSION FOR THE DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

2. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR EXPLAINED TO THE CHINESE SIDE OUR VIEWS ON THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE WORLD WITH FRANKNESS. HE GAVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO THE POSITIVE ROLE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, UNDERLINED THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE GLOBAL BALANCE AND CALLED ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE MENTIONED THE GROWING TOGETHER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CLOSE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

3. MAO TSE TUNG AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TENG HSIAO PING ONCE AGAIN ADVANCED THEIR THESIS OF THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF A THIRD WORLD WAR. SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS IN 1963, 1972 AND 1974, THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE WORLD WAS SHIFTING MORE AND MORE IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN VIEW OF THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION, THE STATIONING OF AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE WAS A NECESSITY. A WARNING WAS EXPRESSED NOT TO FALL VICTIM TO THE ILLUSION THAT THERE COULD BE DETENTE OR LASTING PEACE. IT WAS ALSO A MISTAKE TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET UNION BY GRAIN DELIVERIES, THE GRANTING OF CREDITS OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

4. THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WAS GREATLY IMPRESSED BY HIS TALKS, ESPECIALLY THE CONVERSATION WITH MAO. ALTHOUGH MAO HAD AGED PHYSICALLY, HE STILL HAD AN EXTREMELY KEEN MIND AND CLOSELY FOLLOWED THOSE QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY WHICH HE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. AS TO THE CERTAINTY OF A THIRD WORLD WAR WHICH HAD BEEN MENTIONED BY VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO PING, MAO SAID THAT SUCH A WAR WOULD ONLY BREAK OUT IN TEN OR THIRTY YEARS TIME. MAO STRESSED THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE EUROPEAN UNITY AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE, ESPECIALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 06152 01 OF 02 122242Z

WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

5. VICE PREMIER TENG IMPRESSED THE VISITORS AS BEING ALERT AND QUICK, BUT DID NOT PUT FORWARD MATTERS OF FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT OBTAINING, IN EACH CASE, THE AGREEMENT OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. IT SEEMS THAT HE IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR QUESTIONS OF DOMESTIC POLICY.

II. MAIN SUBJECTS OF THE TALKS

1. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEN BY THE CHINESE IN A SIMILAR LIGHT AS THAT OF THE CHINESE IN SOVIET EYES. WHILE THE SOVIETS ACCUSE THE CHINESE OF HAVING BETRAYED MARXISM, MAO CLAIMS THAT IT WAS COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION

TO RETURN TO LENINISM BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING SOCIAL CONDITIONS
HAD CHANGED. TODAY, THE CHINESE BELIEVE THAT ONLY THE SOCIAL
IMPERIALIST ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION IS DECISIVE. THEY
ASSERT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE DISTRACTED FROM ITS
IMPERIALIST AIMS EVEN BY IMPROVED ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE
WEST AND THE DEPENDENCE WHICH IS THE OBJECT OF THIS
COOPERATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 06152 02 OF 02 122249Z

64

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6152

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LINE ADOPTED IN 1973, THE SINO SOVIET
CONFLICT IS NO LONGER REGARDED AS A MENACE, FOR THE FOLOWING
REASONS:

- EVEN IF THE SOVIETS CONTROLLED CHINA, THIS WOULD NO
LONGER ENSURE TO THEM THE WORLDHEGEMONY TO WHICH THEY ASPIRED;
- THE CHINESE BELIEVE THAT FOR A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK
ON CHINA AND IN VIEW OF A FRONTIER HAVING A LENGTH OF 7,000
KMS, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO USE AT LEAST 3 MILLION MEN WHO
WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE;
- A NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST CHANA WAS CONCEIVALBE BUT WOULD
NOT BE OF ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE IT COULD
NEVER OCCUPY CHINA.

3. EUROPE IS REGARDED BY THE CHINESE AS THE FOCAL POINT OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BECAUSE WORLDHEGEMONY WAS ONLY
POSSIBLE TO THAT POWER WHICH CONTROLLED EUROPE. THIS THESEIS

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 06152 02 OF 02 122249Z

HAS BEEN ADVANCED BY PEKING SINCE 1973.

4. AS FAR AS THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS CONCERNED, THE CHINESE DID NOT SAY VERY MUCH. THEY REFERRED TO THE POSITION THEY TOOK AT THE UN AND THEIR ATTITUDE- WHICH THEY ADOPTED A FEW MONTHS AGO- TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM. THEY EXPLICITLY WELCOMED THE PARIS MEETING. HOWEVER, AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE SIDE THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR PUT FORWARD OUR ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN A MANNER WHICH CLEARLY MET WITH THE CHINESE INTEREST BUT WHICH ON THE OTHER HAND MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GIVE CLOSER ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ITS SOLUTION. THE CHINESE WERE SPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OF WHY THE OIL CRISIS BENEFITED THE SOVIETS AND WHY ON THE OTHER HAND THE SOVIET UNION HAD (TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES) EXPRESSED ITSELF AGAINST HIGHER OIL PRICES AT THE UN.

PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

5. IN ORDER NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW, THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD, IN HIS MAIN SPEECH ON 29 OCTOBER, EXPLAINED THE BASIC FEATURES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE CHINESE ARGUMENTS. AS OPPOSED TO REPORTS PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW, THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH WAS PUBLISHED. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR LEFT NO DOUBT THAT WE DID NOT NEED CHINA'S WARNINGS TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT CSCE HAD ALSO HAD POSITIVE RESULTS FOR US. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL OBVIATE ANY MISINTERPRETATION OF THE VISIT BY THIRD PARTIES. AN INDICATION THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIET SIDE WAS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT LEAVE THE ROOM WHILE TENG HSIAO PING SPOKE ALTHOUGH HE USED EVEN SHARPER ANTI SOVIET LANGUAGE THAN DURING THE SPEECH IN WHICH HE WELCOMED PRIME MINISTER BIJEDIC AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER WHICH LED TO THE WALK OUT OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM THE SOVIET BLOCK.

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PAGE 03 NATO 06152 02 OF 02 122249Z

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 NOV 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO06152
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751189/abbrzncr.tel
Line Count: 215
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: BONN 18230
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAC: FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDTS VISIT TO CHINA
TAGS: PFOR GW CH
To: STATE INFO BERLIN
BONN
LONDON
MOSCOW
PARIS
USUN NY

PEKING
AMCONGEN HONG KONG

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006